The Cuban Movement of Conscientious Objector Military Personnel, led by General Rafael del Pino, released a statement directly challenging generals and colonels of the Cuban Armed Forces on the fifth anniversary of July 11, 2021, demanding that they withdraw their support for the Castro family and assume power alongside the people.
The Movement’s statement describes Cuba not as a socialist state but as “a mafia state controlled by a kleptocratic oligarchy that steals resources from the people.” The text points directly to the recent public statements by the grandson of Raúl Castro—whom it refers to as “Cangrejo” (The Crab)—as proof that real power rests with the ruling family and not with the party’s institutions.
Del Pino and the signatories accuse the military commanders of acting as a “private mercenary army” at the service of that family structure. The call is explicit: “Remove that family from the throne to which they intend to bolt their descendants. Go down in history as worthy mambises, not as gangsters at the service of a gang of mobsters.”
The text coincides with an analysis by sociologist Cecilia Bobes—a researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Mexico—which documents an unprecedented escalation of protests on the island during 2026.
We recommend reading: Sheinbaum recognizes the work of the Yumare group after 15 days of support in Venezuela
More Read
Bobes recorded at least 342 protests in Cuba so far this year, a figure higher than the total accumulated in the previous three years combined, as she stated in an interview with EFE. The researcher, author of Protests in Cuba. Beyond July 11, pointed out that “the increase is more than exponential” and that protest has ceased to be an exceptional phenomenon to become part of the habitual repertoire of Cuban collective action.
The “multidimensional crisis” described by Bobes combines the structural deficiencies of the Cuban model with the pressure exerted by the United States in recent months. According to the researcher, “the combination of social precariousness, erosion of social rights, weakening of consensus, and political closure generates growing governance tensions.”
Among the most notorious episodes of 2026, Bobes highlights two. The first was the university mobilization against the rate hikes of the telecommunications monopoly ETECSA, which was unusual for taking place within classrooms and at the heart of the Federation of University Students (FEU), an organization within the official orbit. The second was the Morón protest, described as the most violent to date: residents marched to a party headquarters, partially looted it, and burned its furniture.
More Read
People gather before a pro-government demonstration called by Cuban authorities to protest against U.S. policies toward the island, including the prosecution of former Cuban dictator Raúl Castro, in Havana, Cuba, on May 22, 2026. REUTERS/Norlys Pérez
A qualitative change that the sociologist highlights is the progressive incorporation of political slogans in demonstrations that were historically limited to complaints about deficient services: electricity, water, and food. Direct accusations against the government and insults toward leaders appear “with increasing frequency,” according to Bobes. Mobile internet access—available in Cuba for less than seven years—acts as a catalyst by facilitating coordination and reducing the costs of participation.
Despite the escalation, Bobes warns that predicting a new outbreak of the caliber of 11J is difficult. Among the factors that inhibit it, she mentions the “a priori repression” in the face of any call to protest, the “criminalization of dissent,” and the “absence of organizational structures in civil society.”
The massive and predominantly young emigration of recent years also weakens the capacity for mobilization, as does daily precariousness, which—according to the researcher— “reduces the agency of individuals and weakens the bonds of solidarity and collective organization.” Bobes warns that a crisis does not necessarily lead to democratization or the collapse of the regime, and that it can result in “unstable balances in which social deterioration, daily resilience, state control, and fragmentary forms of dissent coexist.”
