Spanish
Although the initial cause of the blackout on February 23 was a single-phase to ground fault (A-N) on the 138 KV Hainamosa - Villa Duarte line, and the subsequent action of the Automatic Load Shedding Scheme (EDAC), the total collapse of the system was produced by a drastic drop in the frequency of Punta Catalina 2.
"107.43 seconds after the system stabilized, there is a drastic drop in the frequency level resulting from the tripping of the Punta Catalina 2 power plant, which caused the total collapse of the National Interconnected Electrical System (SENI)," says the technical report of the Coordinating Body.
It also states that during the event, damage occurred to the circuit breaker located at the Hainamosa end, which led to the evolution of the fault from the line to the substation busbar and that, as a consequence, the lines connected to the Hainamosa busbar operated to clear the fault.
The technical analysis determined that the incident occurred at 10:50:33 in the morning, which caused variations in the system frequency and the activation of automatic protection mechanisms. Subsequently, outages of some generation units were recorded, which contributed to the loss of voltage in the system.
However, the report highlights that the protection and control systems installed in recent years acted correctly, allowing the fault to be cleared and limiting the scope of the event, which facilitated the progressive recovery of the service without permanent damage to the assets of the electrical system being recorded.
Accelerate improvement and corrective measures
As a result of the technical analysis, the report establishes the acceleration of a set of corrective actions and operational improvements that are already underway or in the process of being implemented by the various agents of the system.
Among the main measures are the verification and adjustment of protection systems in transmission lines, installation of differential busbar protections in substations, as well as the optimization of operational controls in some generation units to ensure a more robust response to system variations.
In addition, the national program for the modernization of protection and operation of substations in a double-bus scheme will continue to be accelerated, a process that has been underway for two years and that seeks to increase the resilience of the electrical system in the face of contingencies.
The report also recommends leveraging emerging technologies, such as battery energy storage systems, to support the system's ancillary services, particularly in frequency regulation and in system recovery processes in contingency scenarios.
The Coordinating Body reported that it maintains permanent monitoring together with the SENI agents to verify compliance with the technical recommendations and guarantee the effective implementation of the operational improvements aimed at strengthening the security and efficiency of the national electricity system.
The OC explained that the report was prepared by a multi-sectoral team of specialists from the electricity sector, which allowed for a comprehensive analysis of the event and the definition of concrete measures to optimize the operation of the National Interconnected Electrical System (SENI).
The investigation was concluded within the same month in which the incident occurred, as part of the institutional commitment to transparency and the continuous improvement of the system's operation.
